Raise the Wage LA: Campaigning for Living Wages in Los Angeles and an Emergent Working-Class Repertoire

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Abstract

In a relatively short period in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis and the Occupy movement, minimum wage campaigns rapidly gained momentum across the United States. In particular a purposeful working-class mobilisation of the Los Angeles labour movement in coalition with worker centres and community organisations, and set against the backdrop of the national Fight for $15, deployed a range of tactics and exercised political leverage from 2014-2016 to be successful in securing an increase in the minimum wage to $15 in the U.S.’s second most populous city, in its most populous state. Based on interviews conducted in Los Angeles in December 2016 this article describes L.A.’s Raise the Wage campaign in a framework of mobilisation theory (Kelly 1998; Tilly 1978). It is argued that the elements of mobilisation theory are present and that the mobilisations in L.A. of the kind studied represent an expansion of working-class repertoire.

Keywords

Minimum wage, Fight for $15, working-class mobilisation

Introduction

In 21 states of the United States of America the legislated minimum wage remains at $7.25 per hour, but its most populous state California, population of nearly 40 million, will soon have a $15 per hour minimum wage. It was 2016 when the City of Los Angeles confirmed increases to the minimum wage rate, over five increments to $15 by 1 July 2020 (or 1 July 2021 for non-profits and employers with 25 or fewer employees). This was accompanied by a new six day entitlement to paid sick leave and the establishment of the Office of Wage Standards as a newly created enforcement agency of the L.A. City Council which in that year had allocated an extra $US2.6 million towards minimum wage enforcement (Garcetti, 2016: 11). The state of California would soon follow with the phase-in of a $15 minimum wage by July 2022, or 2023 for employers with 25 or fewer employees. This would result, by the end of the phase-in, in over US$24 billion extra being paid to California’s nearly 6.4 million minimum wage workers (National Employment Law Project, 2016).

Lauded by the mayor as the ‘largest anti-poverty measure in our city’s history’ (Garcetti 2016, p. 1) the package of reforms – including the paid sick leave provisions, the enforcement resources, and the number of people to whom it applied – was at the time the most comprehensive and significant in any local area in the U.S.
Just over two years earlier, representatives from about forty organisations had gathered on the steps of Los Angeles City Hall in front of two enormous banners to launch a campaign, ‘Raise the Wage L.A.’, and its objective, ‘$15’.

What had happened in the intervening period was an example of the L.A. labour movement’s relatively recently built capacity as a mobilised social movement deploying a range of tactics consistent with theories of mobilisation. This article will describe and record the events and argue that the now mature and highly refined model of campaigning of L.A. unions and worker centres is an example of a new working-class repertoire of the kind described by social movement theorists Charles Tilly (1978) and John Kelly (1998). This article begins with a brief description of the mobilisation literature, in particular how Tilly (1978) and Kelly’s (1998) mobilisation theory explains the circumstances in which people mobilise and describe some of its relevant central concepts. It will also describe what has been referred to as the ‘L.A. model’ of advocacy (Milkman et al. 2010) before providing background on U.S. minimum wage campaigning and characteristics of the city itself. It will describe the strategy and key elements of the two year effort to which moved lawmakers to enact a $15 minimum wage in L.A. and California, arguing that the L.A. model is an established and distinct working-class repertoire.

Social movement unionism, organisation and mobilisation

Recent developments in worker voice are sometimes grouped under the label ‘social movement unionism’, that is a unionism that takes on the attributes of social movements rather than adopting a more traditional industrial approach (Engeman 2015, p. 445). Social movement unionism in the U.S. is most often associated with the developments of the last three decades, being pioneered by campaigns such as Justice for Janitors (Milkman 2006; Savage 2006). In analysis of unions’ strategies is it therefore worth turning to social movement theorists such as Tilly who analyse social movements to explain the occurrence of collective action. Although Tilly maintains that ‘no one owns the term ‘social movement’’, he defines his use of it, which embraces that of Kelly (1998), as a ‘distinct way of pursuing public politics’ that has developed over the last two centuries, contains specific elements, and has evolved and spread across the western world (Tilly & Wood 2015, p. 9). As will be demonstrated, in L.A. the organised working-class has developed a phenomenal capacity to influence political decision makers. A key element is coalition building with community and other organisations often in the traditional manner of Saul Alinsky’s Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) and its community organising approach. The focus is on building strong relationships between coalition partners to work together on issues of common interest (Holgate 2013; Tattersall 2010). The power of these coalitions have been enhanced by the relatively recently established presence of new forms of worker collectivism in the U.S. such as worker centres (Fine 2011, pp. 607, 615, in Milkman 2014) and have only made the capacity of L.A.’s coalition-driven campaigns more potent.

The campaigning studied in L.A. exhibits the elements of a social movement as described by Tilly. He identifies ‘five big components’ in the analysis of collective action: ‘interest, organisation, mobilisation, opportunity, and collective action itself’ (1978, p. 7, emphasis added).

For Tilly, interests are ‘the gains and losses resulting from a group’s interaction with other groups’ (1978, p. 7), and organisation is the aspect of a groups structure that most directly affects its capacity to act on its interest (1978, p. 7). Organisation is the product of two things: shared interest within a group placing them in a distinct category, ‘catness’ in Figure 1, and ‘netness’: the strength of the group’s network and the ties between its participants. ‘The more
extensive its common identity and internal networks, the more organised the group’, as Tilly shows in figure 1, with examples:

Figure 1: Tilly's relationship of organisation, categories and networks

Tilly defines mobilisation as the 'process by which a group acquires collective control over the resources needed for action’ (Tilly 1978, p. 10). In this model, 'the broad factors within a population affecting its degree of mobilisation are the extent of its shared interest in interactions with other populations, and the extent to which it forms a distinct category and a dense network: its interest and its organisation.’ (1978, p. 81).

Mobilisation can occur when there is an opportunity. Opportunity, according to Tilly, ‘concerns the relationship between a group and the world around it. Changes in the relationship sometimes threaten the group’s interests. They sometimes provide new chances to act on those interests’ (Tilly 1978, p. 7).

Collective action ‘consists of people’s acting together in pursuit of common interests’, and results from ‘changing combinations of interests, organisation, mobilisation and opportunity’ (Tilly 1978, p.56).

To complete this picture, Tilly described the treatment of groups by the state or other target after successful mobilisations as starting from repression, moving through to tolerance, and finally, to facilitation. The response to collective action is determined by its scale and its power; the power of a party being ‘the extent to which its interests prevail over the others with which it is in conflict’ (1978, p.115).

According to Tilly (1978) and as later applied by Kelly (1998) the circumstances for mobilisation begin with the combining of three elements. These are a shared injustice, or grievance (economic, racial, or other injustice). The second element is attribution to another party (employer, politician, party, government or decision maker), from which comes shared identity among those disadvantaged by the injustice. Finally, in order to embark on collective
action *efficacy* is required – a sense that working together will achieve change (Badigannavar & Kelly 2005).

Further to this, the extent to which a group is mobilised is a product of the amount of collective goods obtained (or conversely, adverse consequences) and the amount of resources expended. Mobilisation is more likely when the collective goods obtained exceed the resources expended – which may only happen when such an *opportunity* exists (Tilly 1978, p.121).

The various actions conducted by groups in pursuit of their claims are familiar: presenting petitions, holding a demonstration, going on strike and so on. These ‘performances clump into *repertoires* of claim making routines that apply to claimant-object pairs’, such as ‘bosses and workers’ (Tilly 2006, p. 35).

Tilly notes that repertoire deployed by groups changes over time, but this is relatively rare, and when change does occur, it is notable. ‘A flexible repertoire permits continuous, gradual change in the group’s means.’ It may occur through imitation of other groups, most likely when the ‘members of one contender observe that another contender is using a new means successfully’ (Tilly 1978, p. 155). Changes to repertoire can also occur as a result of *innovation*, which is rarer still (Tilly 1978, p. 156). The history and composition of L.A. and its labour movement along with societal and economic shifts have meant that strategies in pursuit of working-class interests have evolved to the extent that they represent a new repertoire of action and the exercise of influence.

This article draws on research from a broader study of living wage campaigning in L.A. It draws upon semi-structured interviews with 15 fast food workers, union leaders and worker centre representatives. Primary sources including numerous campaign materials and scripts and related documents were used in conjunction with a voluminous body of secondary reporting and online material describing the events from various perspectives. Workers are anonymised whereas spokespeople for organisations are identified in this study so their perspectives owing to their position are transparent and added to the context. These sources have been used together to verify events studied.

‘Citadel of the open shop’ to ‘the Labor Movement’s great success story’

The history of recent decades of the L.A. union movement has been well described in various accounts of some of the seismic events of the U.S. union movement. The city’s labour movement was central in many of these campaigns which have significantly influenced union movements globally. A body of literature has developed around the often pioneering work of L.A. unions particularly in the area of organising low-wage service workers (eg Milkman et al. 2010; Milkman 2006). In a sea of literature documenting and dissecting the decline – in density as well as influence – of the U.S. labour movement, the movement locally in L.A. has typically been held up as the ‘Labor Movement’s great success story’ (Cohn 2013).

But this wasn’t always the case. L.A. had a reputation in the early 20th century for being a non-union city, in contrast to its east coast counterparts, and was known as the ‘citadel of the open shop’ (in Milkman 2006). This was affirmed in the aftermath of the bombing of the L.A Times building in 1910 that resulted in the deaths of 21 people and in terms of public attention was the ‘equivalent to the 2001 destruction of the World Trade Centre’ (Irwin 2010). Two union members were later convicted of the bombing following confessions. Organising efforts of the early 1900s never recovered, and union density in L.A. remained at much lower levels than the rest of the U.S. for most of the remainder of the century.
The composition of industry and other factors meant that unlike the industrial union strongholds where unions affiliated to the former Confederation of Industrial Organisations (CIO) on the east coast and mid-west, CIO unions did not establish as much of a foothold in L.A. even compared to other cities of the West Coast such as San Francisco. Unions affiliated to the American Federation of Labor (AFL) such as the Teamsters and the SEIU’s predecessor unions had the strongest presence, meaning the AFL and AFL unions remained predominant in L.A. (Milkman 2006, p. 38).

In the second half of the nineteenth century there was significant change to the fortunes of the labour movement when the state of California became the epicentre of organising of agricultural workers. Organisers trained by the Saul Alinsky-influenced Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) began working with immigrant farm worker activists who were excluded from protection and avenues available to other workers under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The campaign deployed new tactics including focusing on community support and use of consumer boycotts. These farm boycotts and strikes including a five year grape strike led to gaining rights for agricultural workers to form and join unions. During this phase the farmers faced fierce counter-mobilisation from employers and the state. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) chief’s initially disastrous invention in 1969 of the ‘SWAT’ (Special Weapons and Tactics) squad was credited to inspiration by the farmworker strikes (Jaffe 2016, p. 229). The United Farm Workers (UFW) ‘organising victories became an enduring symbol of the transformative potential of unionism for Mexican immigrant communities in California’ (Milkman 2006, p. 122) under the leadership of Cesar Chavez, who then led the UFW into the 1980s.

Other celebrated campaigns centred on the L.A. labour movement have included the Justice for Janitors campaign throughout the 1990s in which years of organising efforts culminated in rolling strikes in L.A. in 2000 resulting in securing new contracts for the city’s janitorial workers (R. Milkman 2006; Savage 2006). SEIU organising in the homecare sector led to 74,000 homecare workers joining the union and winning union contracts in 1999 (Smallwood Cuevas, Wong, & Delp 2009). Low wages remain a widespread cause of hardship in L.A., however. As Muñiz noted, ‘while the SEIU’s Justice for Janitors campaign has brought to light the plight of the maintenance worker, most non-union janitors employed in Los Angeles still make subminimum wages, work six to seven days a week, do not get paid overtime, and are often not paid for all the hours that they work’ (2010, p. 212).

Amongst the workers who took action with other farm workers in the 1960s and 1970s, (and once, on expiry of their union contract, were sacked and blacklisted), were the Contreras family including their son, Miguel. In 1996 Miguel Contreras was elected as Executive Secretary-Treasurer of the L.A. Country Federation of Labor (LACFL), which he led for nine years. Such was his legacy from that period that on his death in 2005 he was called ‘the real architect of the new Los Angeles’ (Meyerson 2005). This article studies an example of how the L.A. labour movement he revitalised operates, and how it successfully campaigned to raise the wage for millions of low paid workers.

Tale of two cities

For most of the twentieth century it seemed unlikely that the biggest wage increases for the largest number of people perhaps ever would be fought for and won in Los Angeles. As Meyerson noted in 2013, ‘by the mid-1990s, Los Angeles had become the nation’s capital of low-wage labour and remains so to this day: Twenty-eight per cent of full-time workers in L.A. County make less than $25,000 a year. In Chicago, only 19 per cent of workers earn so little.’ (2013).
The image of L.A., ‘its built environment the architectural expression of the American history of class war’ (McNamara 2010, p. 10) is commonly associated with manifest inequality, both in California, but especially in L.A. While the 10 miles that separate Skid Row and Beverly Hills is evocative of this inequality, statistics reveal its truth: median household income is about 15 per cent higher than the U.S. average (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016), but housing costs put more people at risk of poverty. Using the California Poverty Measure, which takes into account housing costs, 21.8 per cent of the Californian population live in poverty (Wimer et al. 2012). There is a steep correlation with levels of education: for those who have not graduated from high school the figure increases to 53.2 per cent (Wimer et al. 2012). As Kent Wong the Director of the UCLA’s Labor Centre said, the ‘lack of affordable housing and overcrowding in apartments, and lack of access to good food, and lack of access to transportation and healthcare – I mean all of the economic indicators just are such a stark reflection of a tale of two cities’ (interview 2016).

Los Angeles’ income differentials are matched by other measures – race, ethnicity, language, and geographic spread and array of cities and neighbourhoods each with its own distinct composition and feel. Like Montréal, L.A. is a genuinely bilingual city with 3.7 million of the county's 9.8 million residents speaking Spanish at home (United States Census Bureau (USCB) 2017). Sixty per cent of the members of one of the key SEIU locals in the campaign, United Service Workers West (USWW, who organise janitorial and airport workers), are mono-lingual Spanish speakers (interview, Elizabeth Strater 2016). The fast-food restaurants and car washes of L.A. are staffed almost entirely by people of colour. Of L.A. County’s population of 10 million, 3 million are immigrants and 1 million of them undocumented (interview, Rusty Hicks 2016).

‘Los Angeles’ sometimes refers to L.A City and sometimes to L.A. County, the former encompassing dozens of local areas (including the gentrifying Downtown L.A., Koreatown, Beverly Hills, Little Armenia, Little Tokyo, Bel Air, Venice and Hollywood), and the latter to 88 cities, each with its own city council including (among the largest) L.A. City, Pasadena, Culver City, Santa Monica, and Long Beach. ‘Greater Los Angeles’ spreads even further and takes parts of Orange Country. Baudrillard described the sheer scale and sprawling nature of the city as ‘the horizontal infinite in every direction’ (1988, pp. 51-52). Clearly, organising and mobilising people to identify as a category and as part of a network (Tilly 1978) into a coherent campaign across this vast territory presents abundant challenges and opportunities.

**Impact of density decline and wage stagnation**

In recent decades, particularly since the early 1990s the decline in trade union density accelerated in almost all Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (Sullivan 2010), and particularly so in the U.S. where issues flowing from now single-figure private sector union density – 6.2 per cent in 2019 ((U.S Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020), are writ large. The value of the union wage premium, the average extra income received by union members compared with non-members, is considerable, estimated by Gabriel & Schmitz as 22 per cent for men and 11 per cent for women (2014), and provides a continuing incentive for U.S. employers to prevent unionisation, with several hundred million being spent each year in order to do so (Logan 2006, p. 651). The absence of unions in large parts of fast-food, retail and service work has left millions of workers reliant on the minimum wage.

Yet partly as a response to this decline, there are some new forms of worker collectivism in the U.S – an example being worker centres, which have grown in number from four in 1992, to 137 in 2003, to over 200 by 2013 (Fine 2011, p. 607, 615, in Milkman 2014) and in L.A. have established and trustful relationships. There is healthy cross pollination and overlap amongst
the labour movement worker centres and black and immigrant community organisations which also extends nascent organisation amongst non-union service workers with a net result of a common interest and determination and importantly, capacity to achieve results for minimum wage workers.

In the U.S. the national minimum wage peaked in real terms in 1968, and has since declined (Tufts 2016) (see table 1). Not only is the low national minimum wage falling in terms of purchasing power, but the number of workers who rely on it to set their wage rate is growing. As Scott Courtney, vice president of the two-million-member Service Employees International Union noted, ‘64 million U.S. workers earned less than $15 per hour, and within three years half the U.S. workforce will earn less than $12 per hour’ (Courtney 2015) just after the Fight for $15 had emerged – the huge national movement heavily funded and supported by the SEIU and active in over 350 cities.

Low wages in areas of high inequality such as L.A. are felt to a greater extent. The very real personal impact of low wages was in evidence in studies such as a 2014 report that claimed increasing the minimum wage to just $13 by 2017 would result in 389 fewer deaths of lower-income Californians every year (Bhatia 2014, p.18). Minimum wage workers are likely to have trouble affording housing. The National Low Income Housing Coalition regularly updates what it calls the Housing Wage in the U.S., which it defines as the hourly wage a full-time worker must earn to afford a decent two-bedroom rental home while spending no more than 30% of income on housing (Arnold et al. 2004). In 2014 the Housing Wage was $18.92. For California the figure is $26.04, and for L.A. $26.37. The result in L.A., according to a homeless services worker is many people living in ‘this nexus of instability, whatever may be happening in the family dynamic, also a lot of folks that are injured at work, and low-wage workers who are affected by the economy, and then in a market where there is less than a 3 per cent vacancy rate’, a consequence of which is ‘a lot of people who are ‘constantly teetering on the edge’ of homelessness, ‘and it just takes one thing’ (interview, homeless services worker, L.A. 2016).

**Origins of the L.A. campaign for $15**

The origins of the current capacity and effectiveness of the L.A. labour movement goes back thirty years. After a few years of upsurge in activity and innovative affiliated campaigns (including, famously, Justice for Janitors in the early 1990s), a turning point in the politics of both the union movement and the city at large came in May 1996 with the election of the first Latino to the position of Secretary of the LACFL, Miguel Contreras, who also was one of the founders of Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE).

Prior to the election of Contreras as Secretary, the LACFL was regarded as an ‘old stodgy federation’ (Medina 2009), and, as Gapasin noted, the primary function of the LACFL was ‘to curry favour with the traditional Democratic Party forces, and for the most part it did not extend itself to organising or to community issues. In short, the LACFL did not have either the requisites or the behaviours for being an ‘organising’ [Central Labor Council]’ (2001, p.98).

Contreras's election changed that role:

> He was brilliant at putting together a political program that embraced the strongest rank and file organisers from the janitors union and from the hotel workers, and engaging them in political action. … They built this powerful new coalition between labour and the Latino community here in Los Angeles’ (interview, Kent Wong 2016).
This approach was acknowledged by subsequent leaders, including Hicks: ‘The labour movement in Los Angeles over the last 20-25 years has really invested in civic engagement and the building of political power moving past what we call ‘ATM politics’ – which is basically where you hand a cheque over to an elected official - to taking that money and putting people on the street in order to have real conversations and change the dynamic of elections (interview 2016).

The legacy of Contreras continued and progressed under the leadership of his successor, Maria Elena Durazo. Just before she stepped down after nine years leading the LACFL, momentum among unions was building for a concerted effort to achieve a $15 minimum for L.A. Rusty Hicks, an Afghanistan veteran, originally from Texas had served as the Federation’s political director. In late 2014 he was elected as Executive Secretary-Treasurer: ‘I walk in the door and this is the first thing that I've got to tackle and so it was like ‘you've got to be successful. You've got to win this.’ A lot of people were counting on it’ (interview 2016).

A wave of renewed progressive momentum originated around the time of the 2011 Occupy protests. Newspaper reports indicate that the reception of Occupy L.A. differed somewhat from that encountered by protests in other cities. When activists (as they had in other U.S. cities following the initial demonstration in New York City) set up camp opposite L.A. City Hall, the City Council passed a resolution in support of the demonstration, provided portable toilets and chose not to enforce a ban on sleeping overnight in city parks. The then Council President (later Mayor) Eric Garcetti invited protesters to ‘stay as long as you need to’ and, when it rained, staff of Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa handed out plastic ponchos to occupiers (L.A. Times, 2012). Jaffe, however, described the L.A, eviction differently and highlighted the presence of police wearing hazardous materials suits, and participants who then commenced a civil lawsuit for wrongful arrest, later settled by the City of L.A. for $2.45 million (Jaffe 2016, p.218).

Nevertheless the contrast with other cities was sufficient enough for the mayor to remark, when thanking the police officers in the operation, ‘I said that here in L.A., we’d chart a different path. And we did’ (L.A. Times 2011). Rusty Hicks, Secretary of the L.A. County Federation of Labor (LACFL), echoed this sentiment more generally: ‘Los Angeles is a place where, and California, is a place where we've got a different vision for America than what the [Trump] administration does’ (interview 2016). But crucially for the minimum wage campaign, Occupy created the ‘atmospherics – that the time is right for the conversation’ (interview, Rusty Hicks 2016).

Local organising in L.A. for minimum wage rises occurred against the backdrop of the national SEIU-driven Fight for $15 campaign included a large active local campaign amongst fast food workers headquartered in L.A.’s SEIU local 721. It had spread nationally from November 2011, when 250 fast food workers walked off the job for the first of the fast food strikes in New York City. The growing fast food strikes had captured the attention of the national media and put the stories of low wage workers on TV screens and on the national political agenda.

**Political strategy**

The launch of L.A. Raise the Wage outside L.A. City Hall in February 2014 was not the first time that the union movement and activists had called on a local jurisdiction to enact minimum wage increases. Yet the concept was still a relatively recent one. The idea had spread from a successful group of activists in Baltimore, Maryland whose campaign around low wage jobs in the early 1990s led them to call upon the city to address the problem. The city had passed a ‘living wage ordinance’ that required contractors engaged in service work to pay a living wage (Luce 2014, p. 12). By the time Raise the Wage had formed in L.A. to pressure the City Council...
to increase it to $15, it already had one of the highest local minimum wages in the country; moreover, there were living wage ordinances in over 140 cities, counties and universities in the U.S. (Luce 2014, p.12).

It was in 1997 that a key player in Raise the Wage Coalition, the then newly launched LAANE, came to prominence when it successfully led the campaign for a living-wage ordinance for employees of companies with City contracts (Meyerson 2013).

This complexity and diversity of the cities and neighbourhoods that make up what is known as L.A. is reflected in the regulatory frameworks and divisions of responsibilities between the local authorities. There are, effectively, five levels of government in L.A. ranging from the various neighbourhood councils comprised of elected volunteers, to the cities, counties, state and federal legislatures. Rather than dispersing energy, the movement in L.A. used these many points of leverage to great effect.

Some L.A. laws that did not apply in other States were favourable to minimum wage campaigners at this time. One banned ‘big box’ retailing in the City, thereby avoiding the depressive effect on wages brought by the presence of Walmart (Dube & Eidlin 2005).

When it came to Raise the Wage:

Well, it was spearheaded by the L.A. County Federation of Labor. So they have the strongest political operation in the city, bar none. They have the strongest mobilisation capacity. They have more people campaigning during election season, they have more people on phone banks, they have more people doing door to door than anyone else. Even the L.A. Chamber of Commerce will acknowledge that, that there's no-one that comes close to turning out voters to the L.A. labour movement. As a consequence they have significant influence within the City Council and within the County Board of Supervisors, because the most important endorsement you can get is the endorsement from the L.A. labour [movement] (interview, Kent Wong 2016).

The question arose as to how best to tackle the numerous cities and counties in L.A. and California. One option was ‘a strategy of ... just go directly to the state and just get it done that way because there are so many jurisdictions. There were attempts to do that in 2013/2014 and they were not successful. They couldn't get enough votes out of legislature in order to get a wage increase and it certainly didn't get to fifteen’ (interview, Rusty Hicks 2016).

The Raise the Wage campaign opted to involve all of the smaller cities and exercise their leverage wherever they could, reflecting the strategy in earlier years adopted by hotel workers organised by UNITE HERE, who had earlier won the first $15 minimum wage ordinance in their Raise L.A. campaign:

We wanted the entire city council to vote yes on it so we tried to create some committee, some community partner in every single district. We targeted neighbourhood councils, arguing that when people have more dollars in their pocket they spend locally and that helps small business (interview, Rachel Torres 2016).

So with allies assembling and coordination in place, an initial plan was made and the Raise the Wage Coalition set up securing support from decision makers, prosecuting a multifaceted strategy, aiming to firstly:

win L.A. City, which would cover four million residents, about a million workers. Then get the county, the unincorporated portions of the county which covers another
million residents, gets you about another 200,000 workers under 15 and then try to go to sizeable but smaller jurisdictions in the county of Los Angeles. Keep in mind there's 88 cities in the county of Los Angeles. So it was L.A. City, L.A. County and then try to go to places like Santa Monica, Pasadena, West Hollywood, Long Beach. At the same time there was a move going on at the state level – a track that was running in the legislature and a track that was collecting signatures for a ballot measure to basically leverage the legislature into doing it. Saying 'we're going to go to the ballot or you do it. One of the two but this is going to happen’ (interview, Rusty Hicks 2016).

Building a coalition

DeFilippis (2004), reflecting on the anti-globalisation protests in Seattle and other cities, plaintively asks ‘where were the community organisations?’ In L.A., however, community organisations were present alongside the labour movement and citizens and activists motivated to action by the Occupy protests. They were there not out of altruistic solidarity or obligation, but because they shared elements of the same agenda, and because of the knowledge gained by experience that to win required working together in coalition rather than alone.

Nevertheless, subtly different perspectives revealed in interviews with various union organisations suggested that each organisation saw itself as being close to the centre of the campaign – which from their perspective was entirely plausible – but could not be true, at least not in equal measure.

Certainly as the dominant organisation putting a $15 minimum wage on the national agenda, the SEIU were accommodative and encouraging of the localisation of campaigns. Be it local coalition efforts or their directly funded Fight for $15 organisers ‘they weren't like Fight for $15 SEIU Local 721’ says Adam Hall, referring to the downtown L.A. SEIU local that served as the host and home base for Fight for $15 organisers and staff in L.A. ‘In Atlanta it was Raise Up Atlanta, and things like that, not one of them badged themselves up as SEIU’ (interview, Adam Hall 2016). In L.A. the broader campaign ‘tried to put sort of an L.A. feel to the campaign and that's where the Raise the Wage concept came from’ (interview, Rusty Hicks 2016).

Yet, each organisation saw itself as playing a key role and perhaps this was a factor that contributed to their engagement and the campaign's success. Rusty Hicks said ‘We created that infrastructure in order to ensure that community groups felt like they were really a part of the effort and that it wasn't just a labour campaign that we were asking them to sign onto and that they were an important part of it’ (interview 2016).

In their earlier campaign, UNITE HERE had adopted a comprehensive approach to approaching and assembling allies:

We broke them up into fifteen categories. We wanted Democratic clubs to endorse the policy because the Democratic Party didn’t have it in their platform then. We got a lot of housing groups to sign on, they’re just sort of natural allies in our fight. Both tenants’ rights organisation like the Coalition for Economic Survival, there’s housing corporations and Strategic Actions for a Just Economy which represents tenants as well as many students. We work with professors in different universities that made it part of their class that students had to get signatories in support of the policy. We ended up getting 8000 signatures (interview 2016).
Indeed, one of the most starkly noticeable characteristics of the Raise the Wage coalition was the range of organisations that were active. The work of the UCLA Labor Centre was leading and critical. Organising Director of the UFCW local in L.A., Rigo Valdez, commenting on the close collaboration between the union movement, immigrant communities and their organisations, called the UCLA Labor Centre’s Project Director, Victor Narro, who had been active on several campaigns including that on wage theft, ‘the father of all of this’ (interview, Rigo Valdez 2016).

Although active in research and passive forms of engagement, university departments or research centres themselves seldom participate as actors alongside unions or civil society organisations nor, generally, do faculty members see it as their role. The UCLA Labor Center, however, went much further and, according to unions and worker centres alike – remains a key driver of social, racial and economic justice campaigns. This is equally true of a diverse range of organisations that may have begun with a single core issue or function but the leadership then becomes awareness of an interconnectedness of housing, transport, discrimination, economic, and employment issues. The East L.A. Community Corporation (ELACC) is an example: it primarily provides community housing and cultural programmes and advice and advocacy.

Even after UNITE HERE’s successful Raise L.A. campaign for hotel workers, there were three separate concurrent campaigns in L.A. – the SEIU’s Fight for $15, the Raise the Wage campaign, and the Wage Theft Coalition. The Koreatown Immigrant Workers Alliance (KIWA), Restaurant Opportunities Centre L.A. (ROC L.A.) and Clean Carwash were the key worker centres involved in the last of these, along with the UCLA Labor Center. The active engagement of these worker centres in the Raise the Wage campaign was conditional upon resources for enforcement being a key demand: ‘yes, of course we needed a higher minimum wage but we also need enforcement because no one was enforcing the current minimum wage,’ said KIWA’s Scarlett Deleon (interview 2016).

For Deleon, many instances of wage theft that went further than non-payment of the minimum hourly rate. She described examples of L.A. textile workers who had sought the advice and assistance of KIWA after they attended their workplace to find stock and equipment removed and the premises locked up, management afterwards uncontactable with wages for hours worked and entitlements owed to them (interview 2016).

The membership of and relationships between unions and community organisations in L.A. are overlapping and fluid, largely a result of members having worked on the same campaigns. El Super is a Mexican-based, mostly non-union supermarket chain that for many Latino neighbourhoods in L.A. was the only grocery store. Its employees stood to benefit from a $15 minimum wage, and the chain was the subject of a major United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) organising and campaign effort. The push to unionise this fast growing entrant to the U.S grocery market has deployed tactics typical of other L.A. labour movement campaigns such as coalition building, consumer boycotts, shareholder lobbying, gathering allies among politicians and public figures, and a legal strategy that included filing complaints of unfair labour practices, with El Super sales reducing in line with the consumer boycott (UFCW 2016, p.5). UFCW Local 770 had hired former El Super workers as organisers after they had received leadership and organising training through ELACC and similar organisations.

KIWA, based in the Koreatown district near Downtown L.A., was one of the first worker centres established in the U.S. It is multi-ethnic, organising both Korean and Latino workers, and is an example of how the different experiences and specialisations of each organisation
strengthened the overall coalition. As Deleon said, ‘we were all kind of doing the same thing. And as community members we have this expertise that maybe the unions don’t always have, because we’re working with a lot of the workers that are experiencing wage theft. So we decided to join forces’ (interview 2016).

Such as diversity of organisations required coordination. When asked ‘how much coordination’ was involved, Valdez laughed. ‘A lot. Too much.’ (interview 2016). Deleon described the process:

They formed this anchor group: KIWA, the UCLA Labor Centre, Clean Carwash campaign and ROC L.A. The anchor group is not a body that makes decisions. But mostly kind of plans things plans agendas and took a bulk of the work. But the steering committee always vote on things and strategised together. And then there’s the broader coalition which is organisations where it’s not their priority but it’s still something they want to be part of (interview, Scarlett DeLeon 2016).

Several interviewees noted the power of low paid worker stories in media and in testimony before public committees and elected representatives, and this was an area in which the involvement of worker centres was crucial. The workers involved in the Fight for $15 were adept at articulating their daily struggle and how they sought to improve their lives:

Everybody thinks that just because we don’t have a high education and we’re only flipping patties and pushing buttons, we don’t deserve a liveable, affordable living wage. That’s just wrong because $8 supposedly you could afford rent, but then that’s it. That’s not including utilities, food or whatever kids need - of course you’d need to get a second job or a third job. That would then cut into our time to afford to go to school to get that education and to get that high end job (interview, Fred, fast food worker 2016).

As Jean Tong explained:

The quality of the story of these workers are different because if you have union workers, compared to a lot of non-organised, especially underground workers, they’re more privileged, they have a union contract, so their story is different, whereas if you have [currently] organising workers then usually they’re afraid to speak up because you might get fired. And you have an organising campaign depending on it so you wouldn’t want to put that out there. Whereas the workers at the worker centres, they’re activists and they have been trained to learn how to speak up so it’s a different quality of the stories. And they bring diversity from different sectors (interview, Jean Tong 2016).

Valdez also described them as ‘pivotal’:

because if it had just been labour we wouldn’t have gotten as far as we had gotten. A lot of the workers who were brought to the table, were brought by worker centres, they weren’t brought by unions, so the construction unions were part of the coalition but they didn’t produce anybody who was the voice of someone whose wages had been stolen, the Garment Workers Centre absolutely did, KIWA absolutely did, ELACC absolutely did (interview 2016).

Crucial to bring these organisations together was leadership: Rusty Hicks described in different views about which direction to take – there are ‘some conversations internally’ about strategy
choices, ‘but ultimately it comes down to leaders saying to other leaders ‘I need you on this’. Ultimately a deal is between two people and that's ultimately how you get to a coalition that's strong enough to do that’ (interview 2016).

Deployment

Once this common agenda, campaign objectives, a coalition of allies and a strategy were in place it was time to deploy the movement’s political capacity, which was an ongoing legacy of the Contreras era and had continued and strengthened since. Contreras, according to Kent Wong, had said that:

The very best union organisers are also the very best political organisers. So he was able to implement a program where the unions would buy off their time in election season. So instead of working as a janitor for the one month leading up to the election they were hired as political mobilisers. Instead of working cleaning hotels for the one or two months before the election, they were hired by their union to be political mobilisers (interview 2016).

At the same time a staff team was developed:

We had an aggressive field program. We had somebody picking up endorsements and that's all they did fulltime. There was people dedicated to bringing more people into the coalition and then there was a full team dedicated full-time to knocking on doors and making phone calls. Part of that was volunteer. Part of that was fulltime folks, so people who came off the job and went fulltime knocking on doors and talking to people. We had a fulltime team doing social-digital. We had a fulltime team doing mail. So the goal was to create a real campaign infrastructure, just like you would to run a campaign to get elected to public office. Over the years labour has become much more sophisticated in political action and so we brought all of that to bear around that one particular issue (interview, Rusty Hicks 2016).

This approach echoes the program of UNITE HERE Local 11 during the earlier Raise L.A. campaign:

We had a team, a communication person, a research person, I would do the community organising and we had student interns and engaged with our membership to do some of the visits to neighbourhood councils, speaking at press conferences, doing organising in their shop, gathering signatures (interview Rachel Torres 2016).

By 2015, another California SEIU local, United Healthcare Workers West, had set about gathering signatures for a state ballot measure to increase the minimum to $15 by 2021 for health care workers, and the state council of the SEIU was pushing for a ballot initiative for a $15 minimum wage to cover all Californian workers by 2022 (Dayen, 2016). The mayor was therefore faced with the prospect of two competing ballot initiatives in early 2016. The politics within different levels of the SEIU at the time was a factor that became a point of leverage, as Hicks reflected:

As we got to the end of our smaller city campaign the ballot measure qualified for the ballot. There were actually two. As a result of that the Governor and the legislature had certain important things that they wanted to see on the ballot. They didn't want resources taken away from the stuff that they wanted and so they caved (interview 2016).
Despite the ordinances being achieved in such a relatively short timeframe, and the relatively ‘friendly’ legislatures that were the targets of the campaign, activists at no stage saw the achievement of a $15 minimum wage as inevitable; and the pace at which the campaign proceeded could not be described as one founded in assumptions of complacency about its outcome. Significant increases in the minimum wage were first achieved in 2015 by UNITE HERE Local 11, the Los Angeles hotel workers’ union whose Raise L.A. campaign won a minimum wage of $15.37 for the biggest hotels (with over 300 rooms) immediately, and for hotels with more than 150 rooms by July 2016 (CBS 2014). ‘We had struggled for many years to get that moving,’ said Rachel Torres, Senior Research Analyst and Community Organiser from UNITE HERE:

$15 was like an extraordinary amount of money, like, how can you go to 15 when people are making 7, 8, 9 bucks an hour, so it never saw the light of day for many years. So when the national Fight for $15 movement broke through and Occupy happened in 2011, by 2012, 2015, economic inequality was a mainstream idea. It broke through in a really big way (interview, Rachel Torres 2016).

It’s been said that ‘the minimum wage campaign in Los Angeles really started on Labor Day in 2014, when Mayor Eric Garcetti proposed a $13.25 hourly wage by 2017’ (Best, 2017), but when hotel workers won their much larger increase in 2015, following a campaign that had begun many years earlier, ‘immediately afterward, like, literally the weekend after, they announced a policy of $15, and the Raise the Wage bill then got signed in 2015’ (interview, Rachel Torres 2016).

On 13 June 2015, sixteen and a half months after organisations had gathered on the steps of City Hall, against a backdrop of Fight for $15 fast food strikes spreading across the country (see Figure 2), that L.A. City Council voted to approve Mayor Eric Garcetti’s bill to phase in a $15 minimum wage together with sick pay and enforcement measures. On 29 September the L.A. County Board of Supervisors approved its application to the entire county.

The extension of the local city and county ordinances to the state of California was no more a natural progression than any other of the incremental victories of the campaign. Again, it wasn’t the first time a statewide increase had been attempted; in 2013 a San Francisco State Senator had proposed a phased increase to the California minimum wage to $13 an hour by 2017, thereafter to be indexed to inflation (Bhatia 2014, p. 3). And on 4 April, 2016, surrounded by low-wage workers and SEIU members in their distinct purple t-shirts, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law the phase-in of a $15 minimum to apply to all workers in California, ensuring a wage increase for the six million who relied on the minimum wage (see table 1), increases which would total over $24 billion (in US 2016 dollars) extra being paid to these workers just in California by the end of the phase in (National Employment Law Project 2016).

Table 1: Schedule of increases to Californian minimum wage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pay per hour</th>
<th>26 Employees or More</th>
<th>25 Employees or Less</th>
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<td>$10.50</td>
<td>1/1/17</td>
<td>1/1/18</td>
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<td>$11</td>
<td>1/1/18</td>
<td>1/1/19</td>
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<tr>
<td>$12</td>
<td>1/1/19</td>
<td>1/1/20</td>
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Indexed annually for inflation (national CPI) beginning 1 January after small businesses are at $15. (Office of the Governor of the State of California, 2016)

Figure 2: Timeline to $15 in L.A. and California

Employer counter-mobilisation

Counter-mobilisation and repression is described by Tilly (1978) and Kelly (1998) in response to worker mobilisations. Employer groups were active and vocal in opposing these increases to $15 for minimum wage workers – consistent with their long-held position. One of the most significant, the National Restaurant Association or ‘the other NRA’ as it is known, is a huge organisation, pursuing the objectives of the major chains and has ‘fought minimum-wage legislation at every level of government for decades’ (Finnegan 2014). But unions responded in kind:

The restaurants really took a very hard stance so ROC [the Restaurant Opportunities Centre, a worker centre] did a really good job of putting forward why tipped workers should also be earning a minimum wage. Then [the employers] came out through the chamber of commerce, but this is where the labour movement really did do a good job: the labour movement worked with employers that it represents under contract and said: ‘what we’re doing is bringing up your competition’ (interview, Rigo Valdez 2016).
What was interesting for Rachel Torres of UNITE HERE was that ‘A lot of the hotels that came out in opposition saying ‘you’re going to kill our business’ - they all paid the $15 on day one’ and took the credit for it (interview, Rachel Torres 2016). Similarly David Rolf, President of SEIU Local 775 in Seattle described how in the lead up the Seattle ballot on the proposition to raise the wage to $15 a retail employer threatened to replace employees with automated kiosks, but within weeks of the measure coming into effect hung a large sign outside his property ‘Now hiring at $15 an hour’ (Rolf 2016, pp. 113, 120).

By 31 January 2017 however, 23 states had introduced pre-emptive minimum wage laws, which prevent local legislatures – the cities and counties, from passing their own minimum wage laws (National Employment Law Project 2017). The use of pre-emption laws had long been a tactic of the powerful corporate lobby group the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC).

Aftermath

Hicks believes that in the absence of the campaign in L.A., there would have been some increase to the minimum wage, but ‘as a result of the collective action that came together around the issue we were able to go to fifteen faster than anybody else. We were able to get a huge wage enforcement policy. We were able to [get] paid sick days really as an add-on which workers didn't have’ (interview 2016).

Reflecting on the people who stood to benefit he stressed: ‘They’re not young, they’re not uneducated and they're not lazy. They're working multiple jobs, 40 per cent of them have some level of college education and the average age is 33. Half of them are heads of their household with families and kids and are struggling to get by’ (interview 2016). They were also some of the hardest hit by the most recent economic downtown, following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008.

Kent Wong, Director of the UCLA Labor Centre reflected on the campaigns significance: ‘Millions and millions of people that are beneficiaries of the Raise the Wage campaign who don’t even know the L.A. labour movement, are beneficiaries of this victory. It's a reflection of the tremendous disparity in rich and poor here in Los Angeles. We have some of the wealthiest corporations and individuals in the world. You have communities in Bel Air and Beverly Hills, multi-million dollar estates every single one. And you have 40 per cent of the workers making less than $15 an hour in a very expensive city’ (interview 2016).

Los Angeles (L.A.) is also a city that has come to be regarded as a bastion of progressivism and now a bulwark against corporate depredations and the agenda of the Trump White House.

Wins like these contribute to history, memory and therefore the plausibility of future victory. It is not only the participants who learn and recognise this but the targets of their collective action, as Elizabeth Strater of the SEIU United Service Workers West (the ‘janitors’ local’) reflected on their influence with politicians: ‘We don't have the resources some unions do but we have boots on the ground. Those boots are wearing purple T-shirts. They remember’ (interview, Elizabeth Strater 2016).

Although one can’t overstate the importance of ‘more dollars in people’s pockets,’ the legacy of the campaign is the lessons learned by all involved:

It really made a lot of folks realise that we don't have to just sit around and wait for law makers to do the right thing. That we can come together and put together a campaign and ultimately be successful (interview, Rusty Hicks 2016).
Conclusion

If movement solidarity and building on gains had characterised the L.A. union movement for the two or three decades up until the Trump presidency, collective defiance and resistance are defining the next.

During the research visit to L.A., President Trump had nominated the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Hardy’s, a minimum wage paying, non-union fast food giant, as Secretary of Labor. As Hicks said at the time, ‘you can't give a bigger middle finger to the Fight for $15 campaign, to fast food workers, to people who work for a living in this country, than the nominee as Labor Secretary’ (interview, 2016). Lack of support from Republicans caused his nomination to be withdrawn, following protests and lobbying by union activists and the Fight for $15 over his labour rights record and personal controversy (Raju & Merica 2017). For unionists in California, however, the nomination did not bode well for the Trump Presidency's approach to industrial relations:

There's going to be a lot of work to do over the next four years. We expect, certainly here in Los Angeles with the strength of the labour movement, the size of the immigrant community to be attacked and it will be attacked pretty viciously. (…) You're likely to see a whole series of anti-labour right-to-work-for-less type measures on the labour front. On the immigration front I think you'll see an uptake in workplace raids (…). You'll see extreme vetting and you'll see the demonisation of a whole community. So it's a scary time for nearly a million people here in the County of Los Angeles who don't have proper documents. They're probably as much citizens as anybody else except for a piece of paper. They pay taxes. They work hard, they take care of their kids and so it's going to be on us to protect them (interview 2016).

These comments proved to be prescient. A few days after a ‘March and rally to defend California’ prior to Trump taking office, Hicks echoed the materials calling on supporters to ‘stand together’ and ‘resist any effort to tear apart the cultural fabric that has made our state great’ (Leaflet 2), starkly summarised the position of progressives in California:

You'll see a lot of resistance out of California and you'll see a lot of resistance out of Los Angeles. There are two types of people in this country. You're either a resister or a collaborator. One of the two. There's no real middle ground (interview, Rusty Hicks 2016).

More fundamentally, the interconnectedness of economic and race issues as outlined earlier means that the L.A. labour movement has the opportunity to achieve crucial things – to find common interests and identity, when Latino and Black workers mirror their common identity as low-wage workers, or exercise political power. Bearing in mind Tilly's formula – where organisation is the product of sense of ‘category’ or interest, combined with the existence and extent of networks – elements of the L.A union movement illustrate this in good measure. That issues of race and immigration have played out differently in L.A. in terms of political outcome, is more than can be explained by demographics alone. Kent Wong gave his impressions of why:

I think it's mainly because of the Labor Federation to be honest. The work of unions here have successfully organised immigrant workers. Have fought for economic justice. It takes on fights and issues that do not only represent our members' interests alone. So it has really taken on the fight for immigrant rights; for racial justice; for a
minimum wage that benefits a lot of low wage workers who are not currently in unions (interview, Kent Wong 2016).

Despite Rosenblum’s reservations about the narrow scope of minimum wage campaigning and the Fight for $15 in his account of the campaign in Seattle, the practice of L.A.’s union movement, workers centres and its progressive community organisations are very close to what he prescribes for a the renewal of U.S. unions – ‘aim higher, reach wider, build deeper’ (Rosenblum 2017). This has only come after a ‘20 year to 25 year process of the transformation of the Los Angeles labour movement’ (interview, Kent Wong 2016).

L.A. labour and its community allies now use their coalition model intuitively and routinely to progress their agenda. It is in this sense that it has developed into what can be regarded as a new repertoire to advance working-class interests. A $15 minimum wage was not the only achievement for progressives in the state over this period; there were a multitude of campaigns. The sense that L.A. and California was a progressive stronghold was a common theme encountered during the research, and evoked a sense of pride in many of the interview subjects.

Not only did we pass the minimum wage earlier this year, but in last month’s election we elected super majorities for the Democratic Party in both the senate and the assembly. We enacted policies to secure this millionaires tax, which is a very progressive taxation initiative that was passed by the California state voters last month. We passed criminal justice reform, we legalised marijuana, we embraced bilingual education policies that had been previously undermined by laws passed decades ago. Here in Los Angeles we passed bonds to support affordable housing to address homelessness (interview, Kent Wong 2016).

The L.A. labour movement and those they worked with in coalition used what has developed into a new repertoire consistent with that described by social movement theorists. Their linked identity is as workers, as immigrant workers, and through disadvantage. This identity as a category and as a network are factors present in L.A. and is consistent with Tilly’s concept of organisation as the product of a sense of category (identity/interest) and networks, which in turn has enabled mobilisation to exercise power and achieve a breakthrough. This now established capacity, ready for future mobilisations, can be regarded as a model for social movements in other cities to learn from and adopt.

Author Bio

Paul Doughty is currently Manager, Growth and Innovation at the Australian Council of Trade Unions, and is working with unions to develop, experiment with, and share strategies, tools and tactics for growth. His interest in campaign strategy, power-building amongst workers and new models of organising led him to undertake research towards a Master of Research dissertation which explored mobilisation theory, the Fight for $15 and living wage campaigns.

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List of interviews

Unions and organisations

Michael Crosby, Consultant to SEIU’s Global Program, 2 November 2016, Sydney

Adam Hall, Divisional Manager, Health Services Union (HSU) (New South Wales Branch), (spent 6 week secondment with SEIU & Fight for $15 in 2016), 29 November 2016, Sydney.

Rigoberto Valdez Jr, Organising Director and Vice President, UFCW Local 770, 13 December 2016, L.A.

Jean Tong, Strategic Campaign Coordinator, UFCW Local 770, 13 December 2016, L.A.

Kent Wong, Director, UCLA Labor Centre, 17 December 2016, L.A.

Elizabeth Strater, Communications Coordinator, SEIU USWW, 16 December 2016, L.A.

Rusty Hicks, Executive Secretary-Treasurer, L.A. Country Federation of Labor, 22 December 2016, L.A.

Rachel Torres, Senior Research Analyst and Community Organiser, UNITE HERE Local 11, 21 December 2016, L.A.

Scarlett DeLeon, Lead Organiser, KIWA, 21 December 2016, L.A.

Public sector homeless services worker, 20 December 2016, L.A.

L.A. fast food workers, 16 December 2016 (pseudonyms).

‘Jessica’, fast food worker, age: early 20s
‘Dolores’, fast food worker, age: late 30s
‘Fred’, fast food worker, age: early 20s
‘Helen’, fast food worker, age: early 20s
‘Larry’, fast food worker, age: early 20s

All workers interviewed were Black or Latino workers and lived and worked in Los Angeles County. All interviews were conducted by the author.

Documents

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<td>Leaflet 3</td>
<td>McJobs cost us all! – Join the Fight for $15 on May 25th</td>
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<td>It’s Your Legally Protected Right to Organize a Union! – Raise Up for 15 Southern Workers Organizing Committee, North Carolina</td>
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<td>Fast Food New Worker Rap for 4/14 strike (Dated 29/3/16)</td>
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